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INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
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13922 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Zion's Properties, Inc., against Defendants-Respondents, 
Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt, to quiet title and 
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enjoin Defendants from interfering with Appellant's 
peaceful possession of the property located at 1101 and 
1107 South State Street in Salt Lake City. 
The action is based upon Section 78-40-1, et seq. of 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, providing 
that: 
"An action may be brought by any person 
against another who claims an estate or in-
terest in real property where an interest or 
claim to personal property adverse to him for 
the purpose of determining such adverse 
claim." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment rendered in 
a hearing below on Respondent's Motion to Strike Re-
plies to Requests for Admissions, a determination that 
Appellant is rightfully in possession of the property in 
question, and an Order requiring Respondent's specific 
performance under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
assigned from Great Southern, Inc., original purchaser, 
to assignee, Zion's Properties, Inc., on July 18, 1973. 
Tandy Leather Company joins in this action as a Plain 
tiff-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Great Southern, Inc. purchased certain land with 
the buildings and improvements thereon from Forrest 
C. and Virginia W. Holt on a Uniform Real Estate Con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tract executed January 31, 1973 (a legal description of 
the property is in Appellant's Complaint). All of Great 
Southern's interest in the property was assigned to Zion's 
Properties by an assignment executed July 18, 1973. At 
the time Zion's Properties took full interest in the prop-
erty under the assigned Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
Defendant Forrest C. Holt had allowed to remain on said 
property personal possessions which interfered with Plain-
tiff-Appellant's ability to lease the property and thereby 
pay on the installment. Subsequently, Respondent and 
Appellant orally agreed on December 8, 1973 to modify 
the Contract to provide for payments in a lesser amount. 
Thereafter, Appellant made payment in the amount 
of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on December 10, 1973, 
under the terms of the Modification Agreement previ-
ously entered; and payment of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) on or about December 16, 1973 with the ex-
pressed provision that the Respondent's personal items 
would be removed from the property. 
On February 4,1974, Respondent mailed to Appellant 
a Notice of Demand letter demanding payment within 
five (5) days or Respondent would treat Appellant as 
in default and rescind on the Contract. Payment in full 
of the delinquent amount as determined by previous con-
versations and communications between Appellant and 
Sterling G. Webber, agent for Respondent, was tendered 
thereafter in the form of a cashier's check and made con-
ditional upon Respondent's removing his property and 
possessions from the warehouse on the subject property. 
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Appellant tendered payment on four separate occa-
sions. One tender occurred December 5, 1973 wherein 
an oral promise to pay was made on condition that the 
Respondent's property be removed from the warehouse 
located on the subject property. 
A second tender was made by telephone on or about 
February 4, 1974. The same day Appellant tendered to 
Respondent in Respondent's store the amount to bring 
all delinquencies up to date. Respondent refused pay-
ment on any terms. 
A third tender was made on or about February 19, 
1974 to Mr. Sterling Webber, Respondent's agent, when 
the stub of a cashier's check for the total delinquent 
amount was displayed and tender offered upon condition 
that Respondent remove his personal property from the 
warehouse. 
Finally, a fourth tender occurred on or about March 
6, 1974 in Appellant's office to Mr. Sterling Webber, Re-
spondent's agent, on expressed condition that Respon-
dent's personal property be removed from the subject 
property so that it could be leased. 
Appellant served Respondent with a Complaint ask-
ing for appropriate relief on April 25, 1974. Respondent 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim on May 8, 1974, reply 
to which was returned July 15, 1974, Interrogatories and 
further discovery continued until August, 1974, Respon-
dents, by way of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike Replies to Requests for Admissions, 
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obtained a summary judgment on October 18, 1974 de-
creeing that Appellant had no right, interest or equity 
in or to the property referred to due to forfeiture accord-
ing to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
on the 10th day of Februay, 1974, denying Appellant's 
requests by way of Complaint and awarding all rentals 
subsequent to February 10, 1974 to Respondents. 
This appeal is from that judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT BE-
CAUSE RESPONDENT WAS NOT IN A PO-
SITION TO SEEK RELIEF UNDER THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BE-
CAUSE RESPONDENT WAS VIOLATING 
A DEPENDENT AND CONCURRENT CON-
DITION IN THE CONTRACT BY IMPAIR-
ING APPELLANTS ABILITY TO PER-
FORM. 
Respondent has continually refused to remove his 
personal property from the warehouse located on the sub-
ject property. His failure to do so has prevented Appel-
lant, as purchaser, from leasing the property in order to 
receive rents which, in part, would go to make up the 
installments which come due. 
Such interference excuses Appellant's refusal to pay 
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pursuant to the Contract. Davy vs. Olgier, 87 Cal. Rep. 
2d, 198 P. 2d 92 (1948). In Davy, supra, the Court was 
confronted with a specific performance action brought by 
the purchaser. In discussing the rights and duties of the 
parties to a land sales contract, the Court stated: 
"Time, being of the essence, it was the duty of 
Plaintiffs to see that Defendant was paid the 
purchase price and the escrow closed within 
thirty days, unless some action of the Defen-
dant prevented the close of escrow/' Id. 96 
(Emphasis added.) 
Such holding is merely a restatement of the contractual 
requirement that one seeking to enforce a contract must 
do so with clean hands. 
The tenders, discussed in Argument III, satisfied 
the requirement upon Appellant to make payments. Ven-
dor-Respondent has failed, in the instant case, to keep 
the commitment of any vendor implied under law that 
he render the subject matter of the contract fit for the 
use it was intended. Similarly, in Hayward vs. Voorhees, 
12 U. 2d 316, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961), a case concerning dis-
tribution of pasture land in probate the Court pointed out 
that a vendor of land sold by contract could not unilater-
ally repudiate the contract. 
The action by the Respondent herein amounts to an 
unlimited repudiation because Appellant satisfied the 
legal and contractual duty upon him to make payments 
by making two payments under the oral modification and 
tendering four others. 
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In Marlowe Investment Company vs. Radmall, 26 
U. 2d 134, 485 P. 2d 1402 (1971), the vendor's assignee 
brought an action to recover payments accrued under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. In holding against the 
assignee, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Nevertheless, if it plainly appears that he 
(vendor) has so lost or encumbered his owner-
ship or his title that he will not be able to ful-
fill his contract, he cannot insist that the pur-
chaser continue to make payments when it is 
obvious his own performance will not be forth-
coming." Ibid 1408. 
If such a limitation is placed upon a vendor in an 
anticipatory breach action, no less a burden is required 
in the instant case where the vendor, at all times, could 
have performed on the contract by merely removing his 
property. 
Other states are in accord. In Huggins vs. Green 
Top Dairy Farms, Inc., 75 Idaho 436, 273 P. 2d 399 
(1954), the Court was presented an action by the vendors 
of the dairy against its purchaser seeking forfeiture of 
the agreement for sale. The Court held for the purchaser 
because the vendors, being materially in default on the 
contract, could not enforce a forfeiture of it. The Court 
stated: 
"The Vendors of a dairy business, who had 
failed to perform their part of the contract in 
several particulars, were not in a position to 
repudiate the entire contract and demand per-
formance by the purchaser relative to payment 
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for merchandise or other unliquidated sums." 
Ibid at 406. 
The Court thereupon cited as authority 12 Am. Jur. 
959, Section 382, which cites that a party who positively 
refuses to perform under his contract cannot sue another 
for nonperformance, whether the promises are indepen-
dent or not, if one is the consideration for the other and 
the contract is wholly executory. 
In the instant case, the consideration for payment 
by the purchaser is possession of the property in question 
without any encumbrances, encroachments or interfer-
ence by the vendor. By nature, the contract is executory 
because it is a Uniform Real Estate Contract and there-
fore, the purchaser acquires all incidents of ownership, 
except legal title and is regarded in equity as owner of 
the property while the vendor maintains legal title. Jelco, 
Inc. vs. Third Judicial District Court, 29 U. 2d 472, 511 
P. 2d 739 (1973). 
Further cases are in accord and hold that until one 
has offered to perform a mutually dependent condition, 
he cannot place another party in default. Thein vs. Sticha, 
93 Cal. App. 2d 295, 209 P. 2d 13 (1949); Lifton vs. Harsh-
man, 80 Cal. App. 2d 422,182 P. 2d 222 (1947). 
Further, in Barton vs. Baird, 163 Cal. App. 2d 502, 
329 P. 2d 492 (1958), the Court stated: 
"In a contract for the sale of land where per-
formance is due on a certain date, even if time 
is of the essence, a party who fails to perform 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is not in default until the other party places 
him in default by making a tender." Ibid 494. 
In order for Respondent to prevail in this quiet title 
action, he therefore must have placed the Appellant in 
default by making a legally sufficient tender. The de-
mand letter of February 4, 1974, does not qualify as such 
a tender since a vendor must tender either title or not 
interfere with the purchaser's quiet enjoyment of the 
property. By interfering with Appellant's ability to lease 
the property as the property's main use, Respondent 
failed to tender all he was required to do under the con-
tract. The tender must have been a demand when Re-
spondent was performing as the law and the contract 
provided. 
To summarize, Respondent's action in failing to re-
move his property, thereby rendering the real estate in 
question non-leaseable, impaired Appellant's ability to 
perform under the contract. Under these circumstances, 
after Appellant offered to pay the installments on four 
occasions provided the property be removed, Appellant 
was justified in withholding payment and bringing a quiet 
title action and it should be so decreed. 
The dilemma of the purchaser where he does not 
desire to repudiate the contract but wants specific per-
formance by the vendor and cannot afford to continue 
the contract, has been pointed out in many cases. In 
McFadden vs. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P. 2d 1353 
(1971), the Court again, addressed this situation and 
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held that a wilfully defaulting vendee may secure specific 
performance of a land sales contract. 
Appellant's request for specific performance should, 
therefore, be granted regardless of the actions of Respon-
dent; however, where Respondent has wilfully impaired 
Appellant's ability to perform under the contract, Re-
spondent is not in the position to default the Appellant 
purchaser. Leavitt vs. Blohm, 11 U. 2d 220, 357 P. 2d 
199 (1960); Marlowe Investment Company vs. Radmatt, 
26 U. 2d 134, 485 P. 2d 1402 (1971); Hayward vs. Voor-
hees, 12 U. 2d 316, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961). 
The Court outlined the basic requirements upon a 
vendor or a purchaser, before either may enforce the land 
sales contract in Leavitt, supra. That case involved an 
assignee who treated a contract as abandoned and ther-
after complained for restoration of her payments. The 
Court stated: 
"A purchaser who fails to make his payments 
cannot enforce his rights, and a vendor who 
fails to meet his commitment cannot expect the 
purchaser to perform." Ibid at 193. 
Appellant herein made four valid tenders of payment 
to Respondent who failed to meet his commitment and 
rendecned the property fit for the use it was intended. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING RESTITUTION TO RESPONDENT 
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AND BY NOT DECREEING SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE ON THE ORAL CONTRACT 
DUE TO THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE 
BY THE APPELLANT. 
The general requirement of the Statute of Frauds 
is that a writing is required for enforceability of any con-
tract transferring any interest in land. Simpson on Con-
tracts, 2nd Edition, Section 77, Page 153. This general 
rule was codified in Utah under Section 25-5-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1053 which provides in part: 
"No estate or interest in real property . . . shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law or by deed or conveyance in writing de-
scribed by the party creating, granting, assign-
ing, surrendering or declaring the same." 
Appellant and Respondent orally agreed to payments 
of a lesser amount on December 8, 1973. Payment was 
thereafter made by check drawn December 10, 1973 in 
the amount of $500.00. Noted upon the check are the 
words "As per agreement 12-8-73". Respondent cashed 
the check and failed to complain about the notation. The 
check thereby became a memorandum, a writing, within 
the scope of the Statute of Frauds. The agreement is 
clear and performance is in accord. The contract of Jan-
uary 31, 1973 thereby became modified in that, until Re-
spondent's personal property was removed from the ware-
house, the lower payments would suffice. 
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Nevertheless, it is also a general rule that courts will 
order specific performance of an oral land contract re-
gardless of the State of Frauds where (1) there has been 
part performance in reliance on the oral contract, (2) 
said performance occurred because of the oral contract, 
and (3) the remedy of claimant for the value of the part 
performance is so inadequate that a denial of enforcement 
would defraud the party performing. Simpson, supra, 
Section 79, Page 157, 
The Utah legislature has additionally adopted this 
provision allowing the courts to enforce this exception to 
the Statute of Frauds in Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. Such section provides that "nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance". 
This Court recognizes the doctrine of part perform-
ance as an exception to the Statute of Frauds. Price vs. 
Lloyd, 31 U. 86, 86 P. 2d 67 (1906). The Court in Price, 
supra, stated: 
"Courts in equity, in establishing the doctrine 
of part performance, have not, by any means, 
intended to annul the Statute of Frauds but 
only to prevent its being made the means of 
perpetuating fraud. In order that a plaintiff be 
permitted to give evidence of the contract not 
in writing, and which is in the very teeth of 
the statute and anulity at law, it is essential 
that he establish, by clear and positive proof, 
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exclusively referrable thereto and which take 
it out of the operation of the statute." 
In the case In Re Madsen's Estate, (Utah, 1953) 
259 P. 2d 595, the Court stated: * 
"Part performance which will avoid Statute of 
Frauds may consist of any act which puts party 
performing in such position that nonperform-
ance by the other would constitute a fraud." 
Ibid 601. 
In Ravarino vs. Price, (Utah, 1953) 260 P. 2d 570, 
the Court stated that where possession is relied upon, 
"it must be of such nature that it would not have been 
given without the presence of an oral contract to convey". 
This Court has dealt with the types of acts that will 
satisfy the exception of part performance. In Randall 
vs. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 U. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 
480 (1956), the Court outlined three general criteria, ex-
cepting an oral contract from the Statute: 
"First, the oral contract and its terms must be 
clear and definite; second, the acts done in per-
formance of the contract must be equally clear 
and definite; and third, the acts must be in 
reliance on the contract." 
Simpson, supra, Section 79, Page 158, indicates pos-
session coupled with valuable and permanent improve-
ments is considered the strongest and most unequivocable 
act of part performance. But there are other acts which 
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satisfy the criteria set forth by the Court to Randall, 
supra. The instant agreement for lesser payments, evi-
denced by writing, is clear and definite, the payments 
made are clear and definite and are in reliance upon the 
agreement. 
The premise of the doctrine of part performance is 
that it would be a fraud upon the purchaser if the vendor 
were permitted to escape the performance of his part 
of the oral agreement after he has permitted the pur-
chaser to perform in reliance upon the agreement. In 49 
Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section 421, Pages 725 
through 726, the following provision is found: 
"The oral contract is enforced in harmony with 
the principal that courts of equity will not al-
low the Statute of Frauds to be used as an in-
strument of fraud. In other words, the doctrine 
of part performance was established for the 
same purpose which the Statute of Frauds it-
self was enacted; namely, for the prevention 
of fraud, and arose from the necessity of pre-
venting the Statute from becoming an agent 
of fraud, for it could not have been the inten-
tion of the Statute to enable any party to com-
mit fraud with impunity." Ibid at 725. 
The elements required to make the doctrine of part 
performance applicable are satisfied in the instant case. 
First, the acts relied upon changed Appellant's position 
resulting in fraud, injustice or hardship if the contract 
is not enforced. 49 Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section 
427. Second, the part performance of Appellant is preju-
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dicial to him and places him in a situation which will not 
result in compensation and which situation he would 
have avoided had there been no contract. 49 Am. Jur. 
Supra, Section 734. Third, there need not be payment 
by Appellant where it appears that he had good reason 
for not making said payment. 49 Am. Jur. Supra, Section 
435. Fourth, the change of position made by Appellant 
was made with knowledge and consent of acquiescence 
of the vendor-Respondent. 49 Am. Jur. Supra, Section 
451. 
Appellant submits that be performed in accordance 
with the oral agreement;, which is evidenced by the writ-
ten Memorandum, by making definite payments of 
$500.00 on December 10, 1973, and $1,000.00 on or about 
December 16, 1973. When it became clear that Respon-
dent refused to remove his personal property, which was 
injuring Appellant's use of the property subject to the 
contract, Appellant tendered full payment four times on 
condition that the property of Respondent be removed. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING RESTITUTION TO RESPONDENT BE-
CAUSE RESPONDENT REFUSED TO AC-
CEPT A VALID TENDER ON FOUR SEPA-
RATE OCCASIONS, BY WHICH RESPON-
DENT PLACED HIMSELF IN A POSITION 
WHERE HE COULD NOT ENFORCE THE 
CONTRACT, 
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Tender of payment in a Real Estate Contract case 
is an exception to the general rule that a tender must 
include actual physical offering of the payment. Tender 
of mutual and concurrent promises in a contract for the 
sale of real property is mere readiness, willingness and 
ability to perform all the required obligations provided 
the other party will do the things concurrently required. 
Katemis vs. Westerlind, 120 Cal. App. 537, 261 P. 2d 553 
(1953). The Court, in Katemis, supra, rules such in an 
action granting specific performance of the damages for 
breach of contract for the sale of realty. The Court fur-
ther stated: 
"A party to a contract cannot require the other 
party thereto to perform his part of the agree-
ment unless the party demanding such per-
formance has fulfilled all conditions precedent 
imposed upon him and is able to and has offered 
to fulfill all the conditions concurrent imposed 
upon him." 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the same 
issue in Home Owner's Loan Corporation vs. Washington, 
108 U. 469,161 P. 2d 355 (1945). In describing the effect 
of legally sufficient tender upon a contract, the Court 
said: 
"Under a contract which provides that any de-
fault in the payment of the interest of an in-
stallment of the principal when due shall give 
the obligee an option to declare the whole 
amount due, the general rule is that a tender 
of payment of the overdue principal or interest 
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before the option to declare the whole debt 
due has been exercised, cuts off the rights of 
exercise of the option. This is so because the 
debt does not become due on the mere default in 
payment, but by affirmative action by which 
the creditor makes it known to the debtor that 
he intends to declare the whole debt due." Ibid 
at 357. 
This view was again re-emphasdzed by the Court in 
Romero vs. Schmidt, 15 U. 2d 300, 392 P. 2d 37 (1964), 
wheare an act of telephoning and offer was considered 
sufficient tender when the tender or otherwise would be 
a meaningless gesture. 
Respondent demanded payment of $11,073.27 on 
February 4, 1974. Respondent's agent, Sterling Webber, 
thereafter agreed that the sum demanded was excessive 
and the lesser amount tendered by Appellant was more 
appropriate. Such lesser amount was tendered twice 
in February. 
The Court, in Huggins, supra, further pointed out 
that when a vendor demands more than he is entitled, 
the purchaser is justified in not tendering the total 
amount due. 
After the conversation of February 4, 1974, at Re-
spondent's store wherein Respondent refused valid tender 
because his brother told him to "not receive payment 
because he could get the property back if he refused 
payment at this time", Respondent made it dear that 
any further tenders would be meaningless gestures. Such 
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action on the part of Respondent rendered this second 
tender and all subsequent tenders legally sufficient be-
cause they qualified as meaningless gestures, as in Thomas 
vs. Johnson, 55 U. 424, 186 P. 437 (1919); Evans, et al. 
vs. Houtz, 57 U. 216, 193 P. 858 (1950). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests this 
Court to reverse the judgment and findings of the court 
below; and in the alternative, to remand for new trial 
consistent with the rulings of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS, INC. 
By 
Lowell V. Surnmerhays 
Attorney for Appellant 
1010 UnivemLty Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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